The Captains of April

In the morning of Tuesday, 11 December 1990, I met Otelo at the offices of the Associação 25 de Abril in Lisbon. It was an amazing experience. Otelo was incredibly charismatic, engaged, and fully aware of his place in history. As the chief strategist of the 25 April coup, he shared with me his battle plans for victory, including the midnight playing of Zeca Afonso’s “Grândola, Vila Morena” on national radio as the go-signal, the military take-over of all television and media outlets, and the closing of the roads with Spain for fear of a Franco-led invasion. He also spoke of his disappointment that the revolution did not lead to deeper social transformations, and how and why President Costa Gomes kept him busy on 25 November 1975, and thus avoided a civil war. He also spoke of his personal desire to avoid a civil war, stating that the point of 25 April was to create a better Portugal, and not for brothers to kill brothers.

In the cold morning of 13 February 1991, Mário Tomé warmly welcomed me to his Lisbon apartment, and offered me refreshments. He listened carefully to my questions, and responded honestly. He was quite upset with the direction of the country in 1991, feeling that the hope of 25 April 1974 had yet to be realized. He was a member of the MFA, and had been taken prisoner following the failed populist-led coup attempt of 25 November 1975. He was freed from jail on 23 April 1976.

I met Vítor Alves in his Lisbon office on the afternoon of Wednesday, 13 February 1991. It was a cold Lisbon winter day, and Alves greeted me with a welcoming, warm smile. His office looked out over a noisy square in old Lisbon. It had the feel of an old professor’s office, with all sorts of books and papers strewn about, and was quite a comfortable place. Alves demonstrated an engaging and lively intellect, and was very responsive to each of my questions. Alves was a leading figure in the MFA; he served as a government minister, and also as a spokesman for the MFA. His charm, intellect, and demand for moderation were critical factors that advanced the West European Social Democratic frame in Portugal. Alves was a most impressive person.

I met António de Spínola at the Ministry of National Defense (Ministério da Defesa Nacional). As I waited for him to arrive, there were lots of military officers busily moving about. Then, suddenly, a car pulled up, and everything stopped as what appeared to be hundreds of officers stood at attention. I had no idea what was going on: I was the only one not at attention. Then, I saw this distinguished gentleman wearing a monocle leave his car, and approach me. It was General Spínola. He asked me if I were Paul Manuel, and when I responded affirmatively, he invited me to take a private elevator to his office. He was very cordial during my visit with him. One of his assistants stayed with us the entire time. General Spínola listened carefully to my questions, and responded completely and authoritatively. He was quite pleased with the democratic Portugal in 1991, and was convinced that he had been right all along, vis-à-vis Caetano, and in his dealings with the more radical members of the MFA. I found one of his responses most interesting. In response to my question of what he and Caetano talked about when power was transferred to him on April 25, 1974, Spínola stated that the conversation had been quite simple. When they met, Spínola said to Caetano “Look at the condition you have brought to the country,” and Caetano responded, “This is not the time for revindication. Power on the street frightens me.”

I interviewed Casanova Ferreira in his Lisbon office on Friday, 26 April 1991. He was very kind and gracious, listened attentively, and responded to each question. He was most notably linked to the 16 March 1974 failed coup against the regime that led to the 25 April coup. He served under Spínola in Guinea-Bissau, and was imprisoned following the failed right-wing coup of 11 March 1975.

In the afternoon of Wednesday, 24 April 1991, I met Carlos Fabião at his Lisbon office. He possessed a larger-than-life personality—he was a man of great dignity and was very receptive to my questions. He did keep his eyes on his watch throughout the interview, because, as he explained to me, he needed to finish the interview quickly so not to miss his beloved Sporting soccer club game that evening. Fabião was a member of the MFA, and came to support a populist revolutionary ideological frame. Unfortunately for Fabião, after our interview, he also witnessed Sporting lose that evening to Inter-Milan, 2-0, in a UEFA Cup semi-final second-leg match.

On the morning of Monday, 29 April 1991, I met Costa Gomes in front of his apartment in the Avenida dos Estados Unidos area of Lisbon, as he was dropped off by his driver from a grocery shopping trip. I helped him bring his groceries up to his apartment. He was quiet, sincere, and attentive, even introverted, during the interview. His responses to my questions were genuine, and he sounded gratified that he managed to play a critical role in preventing a civil war in Portugal. He also spoke of his close friendship with his spiritual director, the Portuguese Jesuit priest João Gouveia Cabral dos Santos Abranches, better known as Cabral Abranches, who celebrated private mass with him frequently when he was president. He knew that Portugal was in a bad historical situation, and tried to help his country to avoid a civil war. He succeeded.

I interviewed Jaime Neves in his Lisbon office on Monday, 29 April 1991. He was very attentive throughout the interview, and carefully responded to my questions. Jaime Neves was an impressive military figure, and spoke about the need for the 25 April 1974 coup against the dictator, and how he was also against a communist take-over of the government. Under António Ramalho Eanes, Neves played a critical role in defeating the radical populists in the attempted 25 November 1975 coup – a critical step towards securing a West European style democracy in Lisbon.